When States Confront Federal Agents: Criminal Removal, the Supremacy Clause, and the Death of Lorenzo Salgado Araujo
On July 7, 2026, Lorenzo Salgado Araujo — a 52-year-old Mexican national who had lived and worked in the Houston area for more than 30 years — was shot and killed by a U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement agent during what ICE described as a "targeted enforcement operation." Salgado Araujo was driving a work van carrying a construction crew when ICE agents attempted to stop the vehicle. ICE maintains that he used the van as a weapon; witnesses in the van dispute that account, stating that ICE vehicles rammed the van and that the agent was never at risk of being struck.
Harris County District Attorney Sean Teare has announced that his office will conduct a parallel criminal investigation. "If the case and the evidence directs us that criminal wrongdoing occurred," Teare stated, "we are more than prepared to file criminal charges against the people, regardless of whether or not they are federal agents or civilians." Investigators are reportedly considering charges including murder, criminally negligent homicide, and tampering with evidence.
Those questions matter beyond this case — they reach the broader framework that governs what happens when a state tries to hold a federal officer criminally accountable. What court would hear the case? Who would try it? What law would apply? And can the agent avoid prosecution altogether?
THE FEDERAL OFFICER REMOVAL STATUTE: 28 U.S.C. § 1442
The moment Harris County files criminal charges against the ICE agent, that agent — or the federal government on his behalf — has the right to remove the case to federal court. That right comes from 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), the federal officer removal statute. Unlike the ordinary removal statute, which permits removal only when the complaint itself raises a federal question, § 1442 is broader: it allows removal whenever a federal officer is sued or prosecuted "for or relating to any act under color of such office."
Congress built § 1442 for one purpose: to give federal officers a neutral forum, away from potentially hostile state juries, when their official conduct is on trial. The Supreme Court has interpreted it broadly, treating the right to remove as a substantive protection, not a procedural technicality.
To invoke § 1442, the agent must (1) be a federal officer, (2) assert a colorable federal defense, and (3) demonstrate a nexus between the charged conduct and his official duties. Given that the shooting occurred during an ICE enforcement operation — however disputed its particulars may be — satisfying these elements would not be difficult. An ICE agent participating in a field enforcement operation is plainly a federal officer acting under color of his office. A colorable federal defense is all that is required at the removal stage; the agent does not need to prove that defense to prevail on removal. The case would be removed to the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division.
WHAT REMOVAL MEANS: RULES, PROCEDURES, AND WHO PROSECUTES
This is where the case gets procedurally unusual. When a state criminal case is removed to federal court under § 1442, the substantive law governing the charges does not change. The indictment or information is for violations of Texas law — murder, criminally negligent homicide, or whatever charges the Harris County grand jury returns. State law defines the elements of the offense, the mental state required, and the standards for guilt.
What does change is procedure. Once in federal court, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure apply. The Sixth Amendment jury trial right remains, but the specifics of jury selection, discovery, and pre-trial motions will be governed by federal rules rather than the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.
Critically — and this is a point that often surprises people — the state prosecutor continues to handle the case. The Harris County District Attorney's office, not the U.S. Department of Justice, would try the case in federal court. Federal prosecutors do not take over. The DA sits in a federal courtroom, calls witnesses, and argues to a federal jury. The case remains fundamentally a state criminal prosecution; it has simply moved to a different courtroom.
THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE DEFENSE
Removal is only the first battle. Once in federal court, the agent will almost certainly raise a Supremacy Clause immunity defense. This doctrine, rooted in the Constitution's declaration that federal law is the supreme law of the land, has long been understood to protect federal officers from state interference with their official duties.
The leading precedent is In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1 (1890), in which the Supreme Court held that a federal marshal who shot and killed an assailant could not be tried for murder in California state court. The Court recognized that federal officers acting within the scope of their lawful authority cannot be held criminally liable by state courts for that conduct. But Neagle established limits as well. The immunity is not absolute. It attaches only when the officer was (1) acting within the scope of his authorized federal duties, and (2) acting in a manner that was "necessary and proper" — or, in modern terms, objectively reasonable.
Courts have applied this two-part test for decades. Federal courts take it up at the threshold: if the government demonstrates that the agent was acting within the scope of his duties and did so reasonably, the charges are dismissed. If the government fails — if the evidence shows the officer acted beyond his authority, in bad faith, or in a manner that no reasonable officer could justify — the case proceeds to trial.
In the Salgado Araujo case, those factual questions are sharply contested. ICE contends the agent fired because the vehicle was used as a weapon against him. Witnesses in the van say ICE rammed the vehicle first and that the agent was never in the van's path when he fired. If a federal judge credits the eyewitness account, the reasonableness of the use of deadly force — and therefore the availability of Supremacy Clause immunity — becomes a genuine question for the fact-finder.
A PARALLEL CASE: HENNEPIN COUNTY AND THE SCOPE OF OFFICIAL DUTY
The Salgado Araujo case is not the first time state prosecutors and ICE have collided in court in 2026. In April, Hennepin County (Minneapolis), Minnesota charged ICE agent Gregory Donnell Morgan, Jr. with two counts of second-degree assault for pointing a loaded firearm at civilians who were stuck in traffic — conduct Hennepin County prosecutors characterized as road rage entirely outside the scope of his federal duties. Morgan's defense moved to remove the case to federal court under § 1442. Hennepin County filed papers opposing removal, arguing that pointing a gun at random motorists during a commute is not the kind of official enforcement conduct that triggers the protection of the federal officer removal statute.
The Hennepin County case illustrates the pivotal distinction in all of these matters: not whether the officer was on duty, but whether the specific act giving rise to the charge was connected to official federal functions. If the agent was acting in a purely personal capacity at the moment of the charged conduct — road rage, a domestic dispute, conduct unrelated to any enforcement objective — the removal statute does not apply, and neither does Supremacy Clause immunity. If the act was an extension of his official duties, even an allegedly unreasonable one, the federal framework governs. In Harris County, unlike Hennepin County, the connection to official duties is not seriously in dispute — the shooting occurred during an active ICE enforcement operation. The fight will be over reasonableness, not nexus.
THE PRESIDENTIAL PARDON POWER DOES NOT APPLY
There's one more piece worth noting. There has been considerable public speculation about whether a presidential pardon could shield the agent from consequences. The answer, in this context, is no — at least not fully.
The President's pardon power under Article II of the Constitution extends only to offenses against the United States — federal crimes. It does not extend to violations of state law. Because the charges Harris County is considering — murder, criminally negligent homicide, tampering with evidence — are Texas state offenses, a presidential pardon would have no effect on the state criminal prosecution.
That matters here: state prosecutors are working in a space the pardon power can't touch. Even if the administration declines to cooperate with the Harris County investigation, even if the DOJ takes no action, and even if federal civil charges are never filed, the state criminal process — including the removal mechanism and the federal court trial — represents an accountability pathway that exists outside the scope of presidential clemency.
WHAT THIS MEANS FOR HARRIS COUNTY
If Harris County files criminal charges against the ICE agent responsible for Lorenzo Salgado Araujo's death, the case will almost certainly be removed to federal court in Houston. The DA's office would then find itself prosecuting Texas murder or homicide charges before a federal judge and federal jury, under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and Evidence. The central defense will be Supremacy Clause immunity — a claim that will succeed or fail depending on whether the court finds the agent was acting reasonably within the scope of his duties.
The eyewitness accounts from the men who were in the van are directly relevant to that inquiry. If a federal judge credits their version of events — that ICE rammed the vehicle and the agent was not in danger when he fired — the immunity defense may fail. If the court accepts ICE's account, the charges may be dismissed at the threshold.
None of this is legally unprecedented. States have been bringing federal officers to account for more than a century — in federal courts, under a dual-sovereignty system that was built to allow exactly this. The question is not whether Harris County has the legal right to try. It's whether the facts, as they develop, support the charges.
Brent Chapell is a Houston criminal defense and criminal appeals attorney, Board Certified in Criminal Appellate Law by the Texas Board of Legal Specialization. He is a former state Appellate Chief and former federal prosecutor.
